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BETWEEN TRUST
AND
DISTRUST

The Federalist
and the
Emergence of Modern
Republican Constitutionalism
Paul A. Rahe

ome years ago, John Stuart Mill identified what de_ serves to be considered one of the critical features of all
political life. One of the conditions of "permanent political
society," he observed, "has been found to be, the existence, in some
form or other, of the feeUng of allegiance, or loyalty." The English
philosopher was aware that "this feehng may vary in its objects. He
knew that it "is not confined to any particular form of government.
But he insisted that, "whether in a democracy or in a monarchy, its
essence is always the same; viz. that there be in the constitution of the
State something which is setded, something permanent, and not to be
called in question; something which, by general agreement, has a right
to be where it is, and to be secure against disturbance, whatever else
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may change." Mill thought the "necessitjr" self-evident that there be
"some fixed point: something which men agreed in holding sacred;
which, wherever freedom of discussion was a recognised principle, it
was of course lawful to contest in theory, but which no one could
either fear or hope to see shaken in practice; which, in short (except
perhaps during some temporary crisis), was in the common estimation
placed beyond discussion." To be sxure, he explained, no community
was or could be "exempt from internal dissension." It is, in fact,
inevitable that there be "collisions...between the immediate interests
and passions of powerful sections of the people." But if nations and
peoples have generally been able "to weaker these storms, and pass
through turbulent times," it is precisely because, "however important
the interests about which men fell out, the conflict did not affect the
fundamental principles of the system of social union which happened
to exist; nor threaten large portions of the community with the
subversion of that on which they had built their calculations, and with
which their hopes and aims had become identified."'
Arguably, every political community possesses a constitution of
sorts a certain "somethingvjhidn. is settled,.. .permanent, and not to be
called in question," a certain "something which, by general agreement,
has a right to be where it is, and to be secure against disturbance,
whatever else may change." Even in ancient Babylon, where the rule of
the king was as absolute and as arbitrary as one can imagine, there were
boundaries that a monarch could not with impunity transgress.
According to the so-called Nabonidus Chronicle, King Nabonidus
remained at an oasis in Arabia throughout the eleventh year of his reign
and did not return to Babylon for the ceremonies held each year in the
spring to mark the coming of the New Year. As a consequence, we are

' An abbreviated version of this essay was delivered at Tel Aviv University on 18 November
2002 as a keynote address at an internationalconference on "Republicanism, Democracy,and
Constitutional Government: The Contribution of The Federalist to Political Philosophy"
sponsored by the Shalem Foundation, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv
University. An earlier version was delivered as the Caspar G. Bacon Lecture at Boston
University on 8 February 1996.
Wherever possible, I refer to works by the divisions provided by the author or by
subsequent editors. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.
' John Stuart Mill, "Coleridge," in Collected Works of]ohn StuartMill, ed. John M. Robson et al.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963-91), 10:117-63 (at 133-34). See Mill,yi System
o/Loffc, 8th ed., VI.x.S, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 8:922-23.
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told, "the festival of the New Year was omitted"—and with it,
presumably, the recitation of the 'Emma
with its ritual re-enactment
of the emergence of order out of primeval chaos. In the Cyrus
Cylinder, Nabonidus is identified as "a weakling." "The correct images
of the gods," , we are told, "he removed from their thrones, imitations
he ordered to be placed upon them." Nabonidus is similarly charged
with introducing "inappropriate rituals" within the "sacred cities" and
with blabbering "incorrect prayers." As a consequence, we are
informed in the Nabonidus Chronicle that, in 539 B.C., when Cyrus
lead the Persians against Babylonia, "the inhabitants of Akkad re
volted" against Nabonidus and welcomed their Achaemenid conqueror
as a liberator. When Cyrus entered the city, "green twigs were spread
in front of him," and soon thereafter "the gods of Akkad which
Nabonidus had made come down to Babylon.. .returned to their sacred
cities." In the Cyrus Cylinder, we find this report:
All the inhabitants of Babylon, as well as of the entire
country of Sumer and Akkad, princes and governors in
cluded, bowed to him and kissed his feet, jubilant that he had
received the kingship, and with shining faces. Happily they
greeted him as a master through whose help they had come
again to life from death and had all been spared damage and
disaster, and they worshipped his very name.
With comparable examples in mind, the baron de Montesquieu
observes, "There is one thing which one can sometimes oppose to the
will of the prince: that is religion." Within a despotic regime, religion
"forms a kind of depository possessed of permanence."Thus, "one will
abandon one's father, even kill him, if the [Ottoman] prince orders it,
but one will not drink wine" whether the Sultan "wishes it and orders
it" or not. Some such "depository possessed of permanence" is always
to be found, "and if it is not religion, it is custom that one venerates in
the place of laws."^

' Ancient Near Eastern Texts Re/ating to the Old Testament, ed. James B. Pritchard, 2nd ed.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 305-07,315-16. See Paul-Alain Beaulieu, The
Rjeifft ofNabonidns, King ofBalylon, 556-539 B.C. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
' Charles de Secondat, baron de La Brede et de Montesquieu, De /'esprit des ids, 1.2.4, 3;io,
2.12.29, in Oenvres completes de Montesquieu, ed. Roger CaiUois (Paris: Pleiade, 1949-51),
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Despotism is not, however, our subject. Our focus is, rather, on the
exceptional situation in which a political community's "depository
possessed of permanence" includes among its principal features the
practice of self-government, for the constitutionalism that most
concerns us—^whether it be ancient, modern, or American—^has to do
with the constitution of political liberty. To the best of my knowledge,
liberty first became a critical feature of constitutionalism in classical
Greece: it is perfectly possible that something of the sort took place
earlier in Phoenicia or in some other adjunct to ancient Mesopotamian
civih2ation, but for this there is as yet no clear-cut evidence. Ancient
Hellas seems to have been peculiar in this regard. Thus, for example,
one finds Athens' democratic politeia—its democratic constitu
tion celebrated in the funeral oration delivered shortly after the
beginning of the Peloponnesian War by Pericles of Athens.
It is striking, however, that Pericles, in his paean to Athtris'politeia,
has remarkably litde to say concerningAthenian institutions. His focus,
instead, is on the Athenian trdpoi or "ways" and the manner in which
these reflect or grow out of the Athenian politeia.^ To be sure, he begins
his disquisition with a brief discussion of the distribution of offices and
honors in Athens. "We make use of a form of government Ipoliteid)"
he observes,
that does not emulate the laws of our neighbors: we are more
inclined to present ourselves as a model {parddeigmd) for
others than to imitate them. To be sure, because its adminis
tration favors not the few but the majority, this form of
government is called and bears the name democracy. But
when it is a question of settling private differences, equality
before the law is accorded to all; and when it is a question of
rank {axidsis), as each man is distinguished, so is he preferred
for dvic honors—not in rotation but because of his virtue

2:247-49,259-61,456-57.
Thuqrdides, 2.36-37, in Thu^didis Hutoriae, ed. Henry Stuart Jones, 2 vols. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1970).
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{arete). Not, again, on account of poverty, is anyone pre
vented by obscurity of rank {axidmd) from being of benefit to
the city.®
Pericles quite quickly moves on to matters that, we might suppose,
lie outside the scope of legitimate constimtional concern. "And just as
we comport ourselves in the public arena {potiteuomri) with regard to
common business in a manner quite free {eleutherdi)" he writes, "so,
with regard to the suspicion that might govern our day-to-day business
with one another, we do not get angry with out neighbor if he does
something for his own pleasxare. Nor do we look askance in a mariner
that offends even if it inflicts no penalty. Although, in the private
sphere, we conduct our affairs in a relaxed manner, in the public
sphere, because of fear, we avoid transgression and listen to those at
any time in office and listen to the laws—especially to the laws offering
succor to those unjusdy dealt with and also to the unwritten laws whose
breach is an agreed-upon shame."®
In much the same vein, Pericles celebrates the city's provision of
recreational opportunities through games and rehgious festivals, the
elegant homes built by individuals, and the greatness of a dty that
attracts to itself wondrous goods from across the world. Athens he
contrasts favorably with Sparta, emphasizing that her accomplishments
on the battlefield do not flow from laborious preparations.^ In this
same speech, he notes his compatriots' trust in the capacity of rational
speech {logoi) to do justice to events {ergd) and their abihty to yoke
daring {tolmSti) with calculation {eklogi;^sthai), emphasizing that the
audacity {thrdsos) which they display in batdeis rooted not in "ignorance
{amathid)" but in a strength of soul that enables them to take risks in
clear knowledge as to "what is pleasant" in life and "what is terrible."®
Taken as a whole, he asserts, their city is "the school of Hellas";
considered as individuals, its citizens demonstrate an astonishing self'Thucydides, 2.37.1. For a defenseof this way of reading the passage, see Simon Homblower,
A Commtntaty on Thug/dides I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 298-301.
'Thucydides, 2.37.2-3.
' Thucydides, 2.38-39.
' Thucydides, 2.40.2-3. For an extended discussion of the ftagility of the ethos celebrated in
Thucydides, 2.40, see J. Peter Euben, "Creatures of a Day; Thought and Action in
Thucydides," in Political Theoty and Praxis: Nem Pmpectivu, ed. Terence Ball (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 28-56.
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sufficiency, versatility, and grace {chdrii} in the face of the most varied
circumstances.® In this connection, he boasts, "We love the beautiful
{philokaMmfi) with frugality, and we love wisdom (philosophoumen)
without softness
" In Pericles' judgment, one consequence of the spirit of daring
itolmd) that informs the Athenians' love of beauty and nobility is their
magnanimity. "In matters respecting the practice of virtue {arete)" he
insists, ^'we are opposed to the many: it is not by receiving benefits but
by conferring them on others that we come to possess friends." So he
reminds his fellow citizens. "The one doing the gracious act {chdris) is
the firmer friend, aiming to preserve a sense of obligation on the part
of those in his debt by demonstrating continued goodwill {eumid)\ the
one fulfilling an obligation is less keen because he knows that he is
returning the virtuous deed (aretS) not as a gracious act (chdris) but
because of a debt owed. We alone come to another's aid without
guidance from fear (adeos)—not so much from a calculation (Idgismos)
of advantage as from a trusting liberality (eleuthen'd)."^^
I have quoted this speech at length for a reason: it purports to be
a celebration of Athens' constitution, but it is clear from what is said
and from what is left unsaid that, when he speaks of his city's politeia
and ponders that "something which is" at Athens "setded, something
permanent, and not to be called in question," Pericles is thinking less
of the city's fundamental laws than of the tropoi that constitute the
peculiar Athenian way of life. Ancient Greek constitutionalism seems
to be all-embracing.
,
This same point can be made in another way. When they reflected
on the constitution of liberty, the ancient Greeks thought less in terms
of institutions than in terms of character; the species of self-govern
ment that distinguished them from, say, the Persians was less a product
of human artifice than a consequence of virtue. No wonder, then, that
one ancient observer defined politeia iS "the one way of life of a whole
polid' while Isocrates dubbed it "the city's soul.'"^
' Thucydides, 2.37-41.
"Thucydides, 2.40.1.
" Thucydides, 2.40.4. Compare 1.9.3; note 1.32.1-33.2; and see 3.37.2. For an interpretation
of this passage at odds with my own, see J. T. Hooker, "Chdris and aretl in Thucydides,"
Hmwcr 102 (1974); 164-69.
" For these as definitions for the tccm poSteia, see Scholiast to Plato, The ham,1.625b, in
William Chase Greene, ed., SchohaPlatoniea (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981), and Isocrates, 7.14,
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It would, however, be a mistake to understand this term in a
narrowly cultural sense. To be sure, in one passage of The Politics,
Aristotle suggests that it is the provision of a common education
[paideid)—and nothing else—^that turns a multitude (plSthos) into a unit
and constitutes it as a polis. But, in another, he indicates that it is the
constitution or regime {politeid), with its politeuma or "ruling order,"
which defines
polis as such. Though apparently in contradiction, the
two statements are in fact equivalent^^—for Aristotle's conviction is
that what really matters most with regard to political understanding is
this: to decide who is to rule or what sorts of human beings are to share
in rule and function as a community's politeuma or "ruling order" is to
determine which of the various and competing tides to rule is to be
authoritative; in turn, this is to decide what qualities are to be admired
and honored in the city, what is to be considered advantageous and
just, and how happiness {eudaimonid) is to be pursued; and this
decision—^more than any other—determines the paideta which
constitutes "the one way of life of a wholepolis."^* Put bluntly, it is the
distribution and disposition of a polity's offices and honors {taxis ton
archoii) that, more than anything else, shapes xiac paideta that makes of
its citizens something more than a random collection of otherwise
unassociated individuals. This explains, among other things, why
Pericles introduces what appears to be a discussion of national
character with a brief account of the principles governing the distribu
tion and disposition of public offices and honors at Athens, this
distribution and disposition constitutes Athens' politeuma or ruling

in Opera Omnia,ed. Basilius G. Mandilaras, 4 vols. (Monachii: K.G. Sauf, 2003).
" Compare Aristode, The Politics, 1263b36—37,
PohUca, ed. W. D Ross (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1967), with 1276a8-bl5.
" After reading Plato, The PepubUc, 8.543c—9.592b, in Platonis Opera, ed.John Bumet, 5 vols.
(Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1967), and TheLatnt, 3.689e—701b, 4.712b—715d, note TbeL/ia>s,
1.631d-632c, 3.696c-698a, 4.707a-d, 711b-d, and consider 6.752b-768e in light of
5.734e-735a, 6.751a-b, and 7.822d-824a (esp. 823a); then, compare Aristotle, The PoUtics,
1273a39-bl and 1278b6-15 with 1295a40-b2; consider 1328b2-23 (esp. 13-14,
22-23—where I am inclined to adopt the reading of Lambinus) in light of 1328a35-bl; and
see Aristotle, The Phetorie, 1365b21-1366a22, in AristoUhs Art PJietorico, ed. W. D. Ross
(Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1975). And finally, note Aristotle,The Politics, 1264a24-1266b38,
1276bl-13, 1277al2-b32, 1283a3-42, 1288a6-b4, 1289al0-25, 1292bll-21, 1294a9-14,
1297al4-b34, 1311a8-20, 1317a40-bl7, 1323al4-1342b34; and see Cicero, The Lavs,
3.12.28-14.32, inM. TuUiiCiceromsScriptaQuaeManseruntOmnia, ed. C. F. W Miiller, 10 vols.
(Leipzig; Teubner, 1898-1908).
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order"; it defines the qualities that are to be honored in the city; and
this in itself constitutes the most important element in the common
education [pcddeid) that Athens accords its citizens.
I offer another example to clarify this point. In the sixth book of
his universal history, the Achaean historian Polybius interrupts his
narrative to provide his readers with a description of the Romanpoliteia.
As one would expect, he gives an account of some of the various
Roman offices. But he seems at one point to digress, for he includes in
his account a detailed description of Roman funerals. This is what he
says:
Whenever any of their distinguished men quits life, he is
accorded, along with other marks of honor {kosmos),a funeral
in which he is conveyed into the forum to what is called the
Rostra, sometimes standing and visible to all, more rarely
reclined. There, with the populace standing round about, his
son, if he has left one behind who is of age and happens to
be present, or, if not, another member of the clan mounts the
Rostra and discourses concerning the virtues (aretai) of the
deceased and the public responsibilities that he shouldered in
the course of his life (tds epiteteugmenas en to avn prdxeis).
Through this, it comes about that the many—not just those
who shared in his deeds but those who did not—recall to
mind what happened, have the events brought before their
eyes, and are moved to such sympathy that his death seems
not the private misfortune of the mourners but a calamity
shared in by the entire people.
Thereafter, having buried the man and having per
formed the ceremonies dictated by custom, they place an
image {eikSti) of the deceased in the most conspicuous place
in the house, enclosing it within a wooden shrine. The image
is a mask worked with regard to form and complexion in
such a way as to be exceptionally similar to the face of the
deceased. These images they decorate in an honorific manner
and display at the public sacrifices; and when any distin
guished member of the household quits life, they take these
to the funeral and place them on those who seem most
similar to the originals in size and general form. These men
don togas—-bordered in purple if the man represented was a
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consul or praetor, purple entire if he was a censor, and
embroidered with gold if he had celebrated a triumph or
accomplished something of the sort. They are conveyed in
chariots: before them are carried the fasces, axes, and the
other customary insignia of office. This is arranged in
accordance with the rank to which each had been promoted
in the course of his life. And when they reach the Rostra, all
sit in a row on ivory thrones. It would not be easy for a
young man who aspires to reputation and the accomplish
ment of good to view a more noble spectacle. Who would
not be moved at the sight of the images of men renowned for
virtue {aret^ all in one place as if alive and breathing? What
spectacle could be more noble than this?
Moreover, the one discoursing on the man about to be
buried, when he has gone through his account concerning
this man, begins with the eldest of the others present and
discourses concerning the fortunes and accomplishments of
each. From this, the report of brave men renowned for virtue
(arete) is renewed, the glory (eukktd) of those who have
accomplished something noble is made immortal, and the
reputation of those who have benefited the fatherland is
made manifest to the many and passed on.The greatest thing
is that the young are urged on to undergo all for the common
concerns and for the sake of the glory (eukletd) that attends
brave men.''
It is, I want to emphasixe, in no way fortuitous that Polybius's
celebrated discussion of the Roman politeia tsxvas, out to be, to a
remarkable degree, a discussion of the paideta—the forma
tion—accorded the ruling order (poltteumd) at Rome. Precisely the same
observation can be made regarding Xenophon's account of the Persian
politeia}^ As both Polybius and Xenophon recognized, if certain
" Polybius, 6.53-54, in Pofybii Historiae, ed. Ludwig August Dindorf and Theodor Biittner-Wobst, in 5 vols. (Leipzig; Teubnei, 1882-1904).
" Compare Polybius, 6.19-58 with Xenophon, Cjropatdia,1.2.15, in XetiophontisOpenOmnia,
ed. E. C. Marchant, in 5 vols. (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1968). See Xenophon, Vecti^al,1.1,
in Xenophontis Opera Omnia; Plato, The PepubBc, 8.544d-e, The Laws, 4.711b-712a; Isocrates,
2.31,3.37,7.14; Cicero, The PjepubUc, 1.31.47,5.3.5-5.7, in OperaQuae Manserunt Omnia (with
Cicero, The Laws, 1.4.14—6.19,3.1.2). See also Leo Stmiss,Natural Right and Histo^ (Chicago;
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opinions reign within a given community, it is simply because their
advocates have consolidated dominion and secured genuine authority
there and, in the same process, have managed to persuade themselves
as well as their subjects of their right to rule by an appeal to their own
preeminence in honoring these selfsame opinions in speech and in
deed."
The Greeks and the Romans no doubt found much in Plato's
'^public and IMWS and in Aristode's VoUtics decidedly odd, but it cannot
have seemed to them strange, as it seems strange to us, that these two
philosophers should presume thatpmdeia and character-formation are
the central political concerns. In antiquity, this was the common sense
of the matter—^whether in Athens, Sparta, or in Rome—and constitu
tional arrangements concerning the distribution and disposition of
public offices and honors were evaluated, as Pericles evaluated them,
chiefly with an eye to their educational effect. To judge thepoliteia was
to judge the citizens, for the chief function of the former was the
formation of the latter. St. Augustine suggests that we "define what it
means to be a people ipopulus)" in the following way:
a people is a multitudinous assemblage of rational beings
united by concord regarding loved things held in common.
Then, if we wished to discern the character of any given
people, we would have to investigate what it loves. And no
matter what an entity loves, if it is a multitudinous assem
blage not of cattle but of rational creatures and if these are
united by concord regarding loved things held in common,
then it is not absurd to call it a people; and, surely, it is a
better or worse people as it is united in loving things that are
better or worse. By this definition, the Roman people is a
people, and its estate {res) is without doubt a commonwealth
{respuhlicd). What this people loved in early times and what it
loved in the ages that followed, the practices by which it
passed into bloody sedition and then into social and civil
wars, tearing apart and destroying that concord which is, in
a certain manner, the health and welfare {salui) of a peo-

University of Chicago Press, 1974), 135-38.
" In this connection, see Plato, Epistutae,7.336d-337d, in PlatomsOpera Omma.
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pie—to this history bears witness....And what I have said
concerning this people and concerning its commonwealth,
this also I should be understood to have said and thought
concerning the Athenians, the rest of the Greeks,.. .and the
other nations as well.^®
Here, in a nutshell, we have a compendium of the features that
distinguish the ancient understanding of constitutionalism.

¥ Modern Constitutionalism ^
We are no Ibnger inclined to speak of a constitution as "the one way of
life" of an entire polity nor as a particular community's' soul, and the
remark of Plato's Athenian stranger that politics is "the art whose task
is raring for souls" makes us decidedly uncomfortable." In America,
only George WiU seems disposed to describe statecraft as soulcraft.
As a consequence, when the word "constitution" is uttered, we tend to
think first and foremost of institutions. This proclivity we owe to
Niccolo Machiavelli and to Thomas Hobbes and to their successors in
early modern England, Scotland, and France.
Ancient constimtionalism presupposed in its practices the
hypothesis that Aristode articulated when he spoke of the human being
(anthrSpos) as "a political animal." When Aristotle makes this claim, he
is not simply asserting that human beings are gregarious. Such a claim
would fail to distinguish mankind from the ants and the bees. He is
contending, instead, that it is only in thepolis that gregarious beings of
this sort "have a share in the good life." Moreover, when he speaks of
the. polis, he insists that, if the desire for mere life brought it into being,
it is the desire to live nobly and well that sustains it.
To understand what Aristotle means by living nobly and well, we
must take careful note of those faculties which distinguish man from
the beasts. In Aristotle's view, human beings are set apart from the
" Augustine, De civitate 'Dei, 19.24, in SanctiAurelHAMgustiniepiscepiDe diitotedeiUhriXXII, 5th
ed., ed. Bernard Dombart et Alfonse Kalb, in 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1981).
" Plato, The Laws,1.650b.
^ See George R Will, Statecrafi as Soulcraft: What Government Does (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1983).
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other animals not by their capacity for self-expression, but rather by
their capacity for rational speech (Jogo^). Man possesses more than mere
iph8n^\ he can do more than just intimate that he feels pleasure
or pain. Thus, his humanity is in no way constituted by his ability to
speak out, to get a load off his chest, to give vent to his spleen. He
could just as well accomplish a purge of emotion by the inarticulate
utterance of the beast. For Aristotle, logos is something more refined
than the capacity to make private feelings public; it enables the human
being to perform as no other animal can; it makes it possible for him
to perceive and make clear to others through reasoned discourse the
difference between what is advantageous and what is harmful, between
what is just and what is unjust, and between what is good and what is
evil. It is the sharing of these things, Aristode insists, which constitutes
the household and the polls each as a community {hoinontd).
This analysis of human nature explains why Aristode singles out
as mankind's greatest benefactor the human being who first organized
the polls, and it accounts as well for his assertion that someone who, by
nature, belongs outside the political community must be either a
god—-or a hunted animal {theriori) alone and at war with the world. It
matters Uttie whether the individual lives in solitude, in slavery, as a
metic, or under the rule of a tyrant or king. Human beings, other than
philosophers, are rendered servile and virtually subhuman by the
circumstances or fully conscious choices that deny them participation
in the political life. They are rendered servile and virtually subhuman
because they are prevented from developing fully those faculties of
rational argument {logoi) and cooperative action (praxis) which men
possess and the other nonpolitical animals lack altogether. We exclude
slaves from the political community, Aristode explains, because some
men are by nature lacking in the capacity for prudential deliberation (td
boukutlkon) regarding the advantageous, the just, and the good; we
exclude women, though they possess this capacity, because it is without
authority (dkuros) over them; and we exclude children because they
possess it in incomplete form. For all but the handful of men capable
of that quasi-divine existence devoted to theoria, the fully human life is
a life ofpraxis conducted in accord with the dictates of logosP
" Aristode, The PoSHcs, 1252b27-1253a39. See 1278bl5-30, 1280a25-1281al0, 1283b421284a3; Aristode, Nicomacheatt Ethics, 1097al5-1098b8, 1169bl6-18, in AristoUBs Ethica
Nicomachea, ed. I. Bywater (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1970). Note Plato, Tie JLtwr 4.707d,
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As I have tried to demonstrate in detail elsewhere, apart from
Aristode's claims regarding the theoretical life, his argument concerning
man's political character and what that character entails differed from
the common sense of the matter in classical times only in being a full
articulation of the set of presumptions underlying the ancient Greek
practice of making political decisions through deliberation in a public
assembly.^ If, then, the Greeks emphasized civicpaideta, it was because
they recognized that genuine deliberation in common concerning what
is advantageous, just, and good for the political community can take
place if and only if the citizens can actually situate themselves within
what was called to meson or "the middle ground"^— which is to say, if
and only if the citizens become virtuous and public-spirited; if and only
if they have been liberated from the dominion of the passion for

6.770c-e; Euripides, Fragment 48, in Euripides, Tragoediae, 2nd ed., ed. August Nauck, m 3
vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1902-5). See Peter Simpson, "Making the Citizens Good: Aristode s
City and Its Contemporary Relevance," Philosophical Forum 22 (1990):
Compare Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Value of PoUtical Participatiott PobUcalFheory
18 (1990): 195-215, with Catherine Zuckert, "Aristotle on the Limits and SaUsfacUons ot
PoUtical Life,"
11 (1983): 185-206,andseeP. A. VanderWaerdt, Kinphipand
Philosophy in Aristotle's Best Regime," Phrontsis 30 (1985): 249-73. From J^stode s
discussion of human nature, it follows that the one element most necessary to
is
"judgment {krisi^ regarding the advantageous and the just": consider Aristode, Th^ohUcs^
i328b2-23 (esp. 13-14,22-23—where I am inclined to adopt the reading of Lambmus) m
Ught of 1328a35-bl, and see 1308a33-35. Compare Aristode, De historia animalium,
487b33-488al3, ixsAristotelis DeAnimaBbusHistoria,ed. Leonard Di^eyer (Leipzig. Teubner,
1907), where Aristode uses the
poUHkbtt s^ou in a less precise sense to group human
beings with bees, wasps, ants, and cranes, with Aristode, De partibus animalium^ 673a8, in
Aristode, Departibusanimalium libros qsiattmr,o,A. Bernhard Langkavel (Leipzig. Teubner,1868),
where he specifies that man is distinguished by his capacity for laughter. With regard to the
ultimate superiority accorded the philosophical Ufe, note the similarity of phrasing at Aristode,
Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b26-27 and The Politics, 1253a2-5, and see Nicomachean Ethics,
1177al2-1178a8 (with1142a23-30 and Aristode, T/J«Mrli56^J7cr,982bl-983a20,in^rrr&ftifr
Metapl^sica, ed. Werner Jaeger [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978]) and The PoliHcs, 1323al4—
1325b32 (with 1333b29-35). CompareJohn M. Cooper, Piason and Human Good in Aristotle
(Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1975), with Carnes Lord, "PoUtics and Philosophy in
Aristode's Politics" Hermes 106 (1978):336-57, and Richard Kisiut,Arirtotie en the Human Good
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). Compare Marcel Detienne, DionysosSlain, trans.
MireiUe and Leonard Muellner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 53-67.
Note Cicero De officiis,1.16.50-17.58, in M. Tul&i Ciceronis ScrotaQuae Manserunt Omnia.
^ See Paul A. Rahe, "The Primacy of PoUdcs in Classical Greece," The American Historical
Pjemew 89 (1984): 265-93, and KepubBcs Ancient and Modem: Classical Kepub&canism and the
American ^voBetion (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 28-54.
^ For an analysis of this nodon,see Rahe, RepublicsAncient andModem,42 (with the pertinent
notes).
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private material and political advantage; if and only if they can then set
aside their private concerns and focus their attention on the good of
the whole. With an eye to man's aptitude for virtue, the ancients
practiced what I call "the politics of trust.They placed full confi
dence in the human capacity for self-government.
This presumption the founding fathers of modern constitutional
ism denied. The basis of Machiavelli's teaching concerning politics is
his claim that "all the things of men are in motion and cannot remain
fixed." By this he meant to convey something closely aldn to what
Thomas Hobbes and David Hume had in mind when they asserted that
reason is always and everywhere the slave of the passions. As
MachiaveUi put it by way of explanation, "the human appetites" are
insatiable"; "by nature" human beings "desire everything" while "by
formne they are allowed to secure htfie"; and since "nature has created
men in such a fashion" that they are "able to desire everything" but not
' to secure everything," their "desire is always greater than the power of
acquisition {lapotent^ dello acquistare)."^^ Instead of succumbing to the
snares of moral reason and the moral imagination, he asserted, one
must take one s bearings from an appreciation of what he termed, in an
elegant turn of phrase, "the effectual truth of the matter." His position,
which he slyly attributed to "all who reason concerning civic life {vivere
civile), was that anyone intent on setting up a republic and ordaining its
laws must "presuppose that all men are wicked {rei) and that they will
make use of the maUgnity of their spirit whenever they are free and
have occasion to do so."^®
From his premise that the founder of a republic must operate on
the presumption that all men are wicked, the Horentine drew a series
of conclusions which astonished his contemporaries and which would
have surprised the ancients at least as much: that classical Rome was as

See Pavil A. Rahe, "ThomasJefferson's Machiavellian Political Science," Rtvietv of Politics 57
(1995): 449-81, and "Don Cotleone, Multiculturalist," The Journalof Business and Professional
Ethics 16:1-3 (1998): 133-53.
^ Compare Niccolo MachiaveUi, Discorsi sopra laprima deca di TitoUvio, 1.6,37,2 Proemio, in
Niccolo MachiaveUi, Ts/tte leopere, ed. Mario Martelli (Florence:Sansoni, 1971), 84-87,119-20,
144—46, with Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (IndianapoUs: Hackett, 1994),
I.iii.3-5, viii.14-16, and with David Hume,H Treatise of Human Nature,ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), Il.iu.
^ One should read MachiaveUi, Discorsi, Mi, in Tutte le epere, 81-82, in light of MachiaveUi, //
prindpe, 15, in Tutte le opere, 280.
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a republic Lacedaemon's superior, that in a republic the people are safer
and better guardians of liberty than the nobles, and that Roman hberty
was rooted in a salutary pohtical turbulence. Those, he wrote, who are
inclined to denounce political turmoil and to argue for social and
political harmony "have not considered how it is that in every repubhc
there are two diverse humors—that of the people, and that of the great
ones {grandi)—^and that all the laws that are made in favor of hberty are
born from this disunion." He insisted that "good examples arise from
good education, good education from good laws, and good laws from
the tumults {tumulti) which many so inconsiderately condemn." To
those who thought this last claim preposterous, he rephed that "every
city ought to have modes by which the people can vent their ambition,
arguing that "the demands of a free people are seldom pernicious and
rarely endanger their hberty: they arise from oppression or from the
suspicions that they entertain that they are about to be oppressed; and
when these opinions are false, there is a remedy in the pubhc assembhes where a good man can stand up and, in speaking, demonstrate to
the people that they are in error." The crucial fact that one has to keep
always in mind is that the people "have less of an appetite for usu^ation" than the grandi-, if one ponders the ends which "the nobles
pursue and those pursued by "the ignoble," one will reco^ze that the
former's purposes arise from "a grand desire for domination' and the
latter's "solely from a desire not to be dominated" that the former
"desire to acquire" while the latter "fear to lose what they have
acquired."^^
From the same set of premises—that desire is insatiable, that
reason is the slave of the passions, and that the legislator must presume
all men to be knaves—Thomas Hobbes drew an opposed conclusion:
that the public good will be honored only in an absolute monarchy
because only in such a polity is the private interest of the ruler identical
with the public good.^® In response, James Harrington then elaborated
" Machiavelli, Discorst,1.4-5, in Tutte k open,82-84. See, in this connection, QuentinSkinnet,
The Foundations of Modem PoStical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) 1:
The Renaissance, 180-86, and MachiavelM (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 48-77.
For the ancient commitment to political and social harmony, see Rabe, RepubEcs Ancient and
Modern, 55-218.
^ Consider Hobbes, Leviathan, Il.xix (esp. 4-23), in light of Il.xxi (esp 5-9), xxiv, xxx (esp.
15-19). See also Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Lam Natural and PoEtic, 2nd ed., ed.
Ferdinand Tonnies (London:Cass,1969) II.ii.1-15,v.1-8, ix.1-9 (esp. 4-5);Tbomas Hobbes,
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a revolutionary and thoroughly modern scheme of republican political
architecture on the presumption that Machiavelli had been correct in
supposing human desire insatiate and that Hobbes was similarly right
in concluding that reason is enslaved to the passions. "I firmly believe,"
he wrote, "that Mr. Hobbs is and will in future ages be accounted the
best writer, at this day, in the world." With regard to the Malmesbury
philosopher's "treatises of human nature, and of liberty and necessity,"
he observed, "they are the greatest of new lights, and those which I
have follow'd and shall follow." If he "oppos'd the politics of Mr.
Hobbs," Harrington readily confessed, it was merely "to shew him
what he taught me."^' Consequently, he joined Machiavelli and Hobbes
in concluding that self-interested rule is the effectual truth of the
matter. He restates the former's conclusion that "it is the duty of a
Legislator to presume all men to be mcked."^ He quotes with approval the
latter's dictum that "as often as reason is against a man, so often will a man be
against reason" Moreover, he concedes that, in practice, "reason is
nothing but interestf and he concludes that "there be divers interests,and
so divers reasons."^^ And in making these claims, he set the tone for
constitutional prudence from his day through the American Revolution.
One sentiment that Harrington shared with Hobbes was an
emphatic dislike of political turbulence. In dismissing the self-styled
"saints" who advocated godly rule in the wake of the Great RebelUon,
Harrington borrowed the language of Machiavelli: "Give us good men and
th^ will make us good Lawes, is the Maxime of a Demagogue, and (through
the alteration which is commonly perceivable in men, when they have
power to work their own wiUs) excee&ngfallible." In place of this hoary

De Cive: The hatin Version, ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), Praef.
[22], II.x; and Thomas Hobbes, y4 Dialogue betweena Philosopher anda Student ofthe Common Laws
of England,ed.Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1971), 76. ForHobbes's
attack on the mixed regime, see Elements of Law, II.i.15-17; De cive, II.vii.4; Leviathan, Il.xix (3,
10-14); and Thomas Hobbes, Pehemoth, orTheLongParliament, 2nd ed., ed.Ferdinand Tonnies
(New York: Cass, 1969), 112-25.
^James Harrington,The Prerogative ofPopular Government(1658), in Works: The Oceanaand Other
Works ofJames Harrington, ed. John Toland (London: T. Becket, T. Cadell, and T. Evans, 1771),
241.
^ Note Harrington,The Prerogative ofPopular Government (1658), in Harrington,Works, 241,and
see James Harrington's Oceana, ed. S. B. Liljegren (Heidelberg; C. Winter, 1924), 152,155.
" Compare James Harrin^n's Oceana, 22, with Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature, Epistle
Dedicatory, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, ed. Sir William Molesworth
(London: J. Bohn, 1839-45), 4:xiii, and with Hobbes, Leviathan, I.xL21.
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dictum, Harrington embraced the thoroughly modern principles of the
Florentine: "Give us good orders, and they mil make us.good men, is the
Maxime of a Legislator, and the most infallible in the Lolitickes." But, in
applying Machiavelli's dictum, Harrington made no mention of his
argument on behalf of tumults. Instead, he proposed to eliminate the
need for turmoil by devising institutions that -would render Machia
velli's tumults nugatory. In his estimation, "the perfection of Govern
ment lyeth upon such a libration in the frame of it, that no man or men,
in or under it, can have the interest; or having the interest, can have the
power to disturb it with sedition." While in Rome, he remarks, he once
observed a pageant
which represented a kitchen, with aU the proper utensils in
use and action. The cooks were all cats and kidings, set in
such frames, so try'd and so ordered, that the poor creatures
could make no motion to get loose, but the same caused one
to turn the spit, another to baste the meat, a third to sdm the
pot and a fourth to make green-sauce. If the frame of yom
commonwealth be not such, as causeth everyone to perform
his certain function as necessarily as this did the cat to make
green-sauce, it is not right.
Harrington's ultimate purpose is precisely that of Hobbes: to put such
principles down for a foundation, as passion, not mistrusting, may not
seek to displace."'^ The "superstructures" of the well-ordered com
monwealth are intended to be substitutes for the political -virtue that no
man can be supposed to possess.^^ Indeed, Harrington's Oceana fits
"privat to public" and "even public to privat utility" in such a way that
no one, not even a " noblemanf need "own a shame for preferring his own
interest before that of a whole nation."^

Compare ]amtsHarrinpon's Oceana, 30-32,56,185, and Harrington, The Prerogative of Popular
Government (1658), TheArtofLarvpving (1659),A System ofPolitics, PotiticalAphorisms(1659), and
A Discourse upon this Seying (1659), in Harrington, Works,242-48,403-4,468-69,483,567-74
(esp. 573-74), with Thomas Hobhes, Human Nature,Epistle Dedicatory, in Hobbes, English
Works, 4:xiii, and see Macbiavelb, Discorsi,1.4, in Tutte le open, in Tutte le open,82-83.
^ James Harrington's Oceana, 32-33, and Harrington, The Prerogative of PopularGovernment (1658),
A System of Politics, and A Discourse Showing... (1659), in Harrington, Works, 271-72,469,579.
Harrington, The Prerogative of PpularGovernment (1658), in Harrington, Works, 277-78. See
John Alexander Wilson Gunn, Politics and the Public Interestin the Seventeenth Century (London:
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In his Oceana, Harrington claimed to have demonstrated that it is
possible to construct an "immortalCommonwealth utterly free from every
"internallcause of Commotion."^^ Where Machiavelli distinguished between
"the grandr driven by the desire for dominion and the lust for more,
and "the people" fearful of being dominated and intent on retaining
what they have, Harrington spoke of "the natural aristocracy" and "the
natural democracy."'® Harrington was persuaded that initiative in
government invariably falls to members of this "natural aristocracy"
and that, if allowed to do so, those who have seized or been entrusted
with the initiative will inevitably betray the public trust. "A man doth
not look upon reason as it is tight or ivrong in it selff he insisted, "but as
it makes for him or against him." Consequendy, he added, "unlesse you
can shew such orders of a Government, as like those of God in nature shall
be able to constrain this or that creature to shake off that inclination
which is more peculiar unto it, and take up that which regards the
common good or interest, all this is to no more end, then to perswade every
man in a popular Government, not to carve himself of that which he
desires most, but to be mannerly at the publick Table, and give the best
from himself unto decency and the common interest."^^ Where Machiavelli
proposed to rely on the spirit of the people and their capacity to assert
themselves through tumults as a constraint on abuse by the grandi,
Harrington looked to institutions. "There is not a more noble, or
usefuU question in the Politicks," he wrote, "then that which is started
by Macbiavil, Whether means were to be found whereby the Enmity
that was between the Senate and the people of ^me might have been
removed.""
Harrington's strategy for eliminating this enmity was disarmingly
simple. Even "girlesf he remarked, know how to provide for justice in
situations where interests are opposed. "For example, two of them
have a cake yet undivided, which was given between Aem, that each of
them therefore may have that which is due: Divide, sayes one unto the
other, and I will choose; or let me divide, and you shall choose: if this

Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).
^ James Harrin^n's Oceana, 61, 84,135.
^ See James Harrington's Oceana, 23-25, 117-24 (esp. 119, 123), 145-46, 174-75, and The
Prerogitive of Popular Government
in Harrington, Works,215,236-38.
"James Harringfon's Oceana, 23.
"James Harrington's Oceana, 133-39. See Machiavelli, Discorsi,1.6, in Tutte Is opere 84—87.
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be but once agreed upon, it is enough: for the divident, dividing
unequally loses, in regard that the other takes the better half;wherefore
she divides equally, and so both have right." In much the same fashion,
Harrington contended, "the whole Mystery of.a Common-wealth..
only in dividing and choosing" One need only assign the right of "debatd'
to "the natural aristocracy" while reserving the right to determine the
"result" to "the natural democracy."^' In promoting social and political
harmony between the ^raWrand the people, where Machiavelli had
purportedly failed, Harrington asserted that one might easily suc
ceed—^by establishing a bicameral legislature and consigmng the
representatives of \)c\.egrandi to a deliberative assembly and those of the
people to a voting assembly called together to approve or disapprove
the proposals advanced by this "natural aristocracy." The former were
to divide the cake and the latter to choose.
! The details of Harrington's scheme of political architecmre need
not detain us. They influenced subsequent constitutional prudence, but
not nearly as much as his conviction that cleverly devised institutions
can serve as a guarantee for justice. David Hume exemplifies the trench
It is indicative of the moderate and skeptical pose that he was inclined
to take that he should soften and smooth the rough edges of the
doctrine that Harrington had adapted from Machiavelli and Hobbes
while reasserting its substance. "Political writers have established it as
a maxim," he observed,
that, in contriving any system of government, and fixing the
several checks and controuls of the constitution, every man
ought to be supposed a knave,and to have no other end, in all
his actions, than private interest. By this interest we must
govern him, and by means of it, make him, notwithstanding
his insatiable avarice and ambition, co-operate to public
good. Without this, say they, we shall in vain boast of the
advantages of any constitution, and shall find, in the end, that
we have no security for our liberties or possessions, except
the good-will of our rulers; that is, we shall have no security
at all.

^ James Harrin^on's Oceana, 25-25,115-17,142-44, and The Prerogative of Popular Government
(1658), in Harrington, Wories, 235—38.

394

1650-1850

Hume acknowledged that it might appear "somewhat strange, that a
maxim should be true in politics, which is false infactp but he contended
nonetheless that it is "a justpoliticalmaska,that every man must be supposed
a knave." He explained this paradox by drawing attention to the fact
"that men are generally more honest in their private than in their public
capacity." In defense of partisan principles and in pursuit of what they
represent to themselves and others as the common good, they are
wilhng to commit misdeeds that they would never even consider if
acting simply and solely on their own behalf. It was, strangely enough,
man's generous, public-spirited propensity for partisanship that
rendered institutional checks of the sort devised by Harrington so
essential to good government.'*''
Hume's restatement of the Machiavellian and Hobbesian position
was exceedingly popular in America. The young Alexander Hamilton
cited the passage with approbation in a pamphlet that he published in
1775 on the eve of the American Revolution.'** John Adams did the
same in a letter written to his cousin Samuel in 1790 at a time when he
was Vice-President of the United States."*^ Moreover, in his massive,
three-volume Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States
of America, Adams not only expressed his approval of the claim,
advanced in Machiavelli's Discourses on Uty, that a legislator must
presume all men knaves; he demonstrated in detail that the same view
was espoused by Thomas Hobbes,James Harrington, Bernard Mandeville, Montesquieu, Viscount Bolingbroke, and Jean Louis de Lolme as
well as by Joseph Priesdey and !^chard Price."*^ He need not have
stopped there. Few, if any English Whigs and few American patriots
were inclined to query Montesquieu's denial that "reason" ever
"produces any great effects on the minds of men"; few were disposed
to challenge his claim that "every man who possesses power is driven
to abuse it" or to doubt that such a man would "go forward until he

See David Hume, "Of the Independency of Parliament," in Hume, Essies Moral, Political,
andUteraty, ed. Eugene R Miller (Indianapolis: liberty Press, 1985), 42-46 (esp. 42-43).
See TheEarmerPefuted, (ire.,23 February 1775, in ThePi^m of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold
C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-79), 1:94-95.
" Letter to Samuel Adams on 18 October 1790, in The Works of John Adams, ed. Charles
Francis Adams (Boston: Little, Brown & Ca, 1850-56), 6:415.
" Sits A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America lyiWl-Z'S), in The
Works ifJohn Adams, 4:40S-15 (yAth556-5S).
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discovers the limits.'"*^ Suspicion was their common creed, for they
were practitioners of what I call "the politics of distrust."^^
No one stated the presumptions of modern constitutional
prudence more forcefully than John Trenchard. In 1698, in the preface
to the first salvo in the standing-army controversy, he argued, that "a
Government is a mere piece of Clockwork; and having such Springs
and Wheels, must act after such a manner: and therefore the Art is to
constitute it so that it must move to the publick Advantage. It is certain
that every Man will act for his own Interest; and all wise Governments
are founded upon that Principle: So that this whole Mystery is only to
make the Interests of the Governors and Governed the same. In the
eighteenth century, Trenchard's "incomparable preface upon Govern
ment" was oft reprinted and even more often cited, and it came to
serve the radical Whig opposition to those ensconced in power as a
kind of manifesto, summarizing their constitutional doctrine.
In Calo k Utters, the most frequendy cited and reprinted of all the
radical Whig tracts, Trenchard and Thomas Gordon took great pains
to instill in their readers the skeptical and distrustfiil spirit that sMves
as the foundation for the political architecture of Harnn^on's Whig
disciples. They were more than capable of waxing lyrical in praise of
pubUc spiritedness.^ But they also deemed it a passion, and therefore
they urged caution as well. "Every Passion," they wrote,
every View that Men have, is selfish in some Degree, but
when it does Good to the Publick in its Operation and
Consequence, it may be justly called disinterested in the usual
Meaning of that Word. So that when we call any Man
disinterested, we should intend no more by it, than that the
** Montesquieu, Ve I'esprit des his, 2.11.4, 3.19.27, in Oeuvres competes de MonUsqtntu, 2:395,
574-83.
See Rahe, "Thomas Jefferson's Machiavellian Political Science," 449-81, and "Don
Corleone, Multicultuialist," 133-53.
^ A Short History of StanMng Armies in En^nd (1698), in A Collection of State Tracts Published
During the Rtifft of King William (London: [s. n.], 1705.^7), 2:653-55.
See William B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation ofPowers: An Anafysis of the Doctrine from
its Origfnto the Adoption of the United States Constitution (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1965),
83-86. For the preface itself, see 138-41.
^ Cato'sLotters, or Essays on Liberty, Civil and KeBffous, and other Important Suifects,6th ed., in 4
vols. (London: J. Walthoe, T. and T. Longman, C. Hitch and L. Hawes,J. Hodges, A. Millar,
J, and J. Rivington, and M. Cooper, 1755), 2:11-17: Na 35,1July 1721.
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Turn of his Mind is towards the Publick, and that he has
placed his own personal Glory and Pleasure in serving it. To
serve his Country is his private Pleasure, Mankind is his
Mistress; and he does Good to them by gratifying himself.

From this observation, it followed that "sometimes the great Differ
ence between an honest Man and a Knave, is no other than a Piece of
Humour, or a Piece of Chance." Consequendy, "as Selfishness is the
strongest Bias of Men, every Man ought to be upon his Guard against
another, that he become not the Prey of another," for "one Man is only
safe, while it is the Interest of another to let him alone; and Men are
Knaves or honest Men, according to theJudgment which they make of
their own Interest and Ease, and of the Terms upon which they choose
to live in the World."'"
In the public realm, Trenchard and Gordon judged distrust
particularly apt. "Generosity, Self-denial, and private and personal
Virtues, are in Politicks," the two contended, "but mere Names, or
rather Cant-Words, that go for nothing with wise Men, though they
may cheat the Vulgar." In fact, it was "a great Philosopher" who called
the State of Nature, a State ofWarf for the "World is governed by Men,
and Men by their Passions; which, being boundless and insatiable, are
always terrible when they are not controuled." Inevitably, then, one
must fall back on institutions equipped with teeth, for "the making of
Laws supposes all Men naturally wicked," and the real "Difference
between Nation and Nation, in Point of Virtue, Sagacity, and Arms"
can always be traced to"the different Genius of their political Constimtions." In the estimation of Trenchard and Gordon, the "only Secret...
in forming a Free Government, is to make the Interests of the
Governors and of the Governed the same, as far as human Policy can
contrive," and "human Wisdom has yet found out but one certain
Expedient to effect this; and that is, to have the Concerns of all
directed by all, as far as possibly can be."
And where the Persons interested are too numerous, or live
too distant to meet together on all Emergencies, they must

Cato's Letters,2:43—56 (esp. 52-55): Nos. 39—40,29Jioly and 5 August 1721. Note 3:224—33:
No. 93,8 September 1722.
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moderate Necessity by Prudence, and act by Deputies, whose
Interest is the same with their own, and whose Property is so
intermingled with theirs, and so engaged upon the same
Bottom, that Principals and Deputies must stand and fall
together.... Here therefore lies the great Point of Nicety and
Care in forming the Constitution, that the Persons entrusted
and representing, shall either never have any Interest de
tached from the Persons entrustingand represented, or never
the Means to pursue it.
From human beings, Trenchard and Gordon did "not expect philo
sophical Virtue." They could only hope that their fellow citizens would
"follow Virtue as their Interest, and find it penal and dangerous to
depart from it," for "this is the only Virtue that the World wants, and
the only Virtue that it can trust to."'"

^ American Constitutionalism ^
It would be easy to show that the species of constitutional prudence
pioneered by Harrington and refined by John Locke, the radical Whigs,
Bolingbroke, Hume, Montesquieu, William Blackstone, and Jean Louis
de Lolme had a considerable impact on the American Founding
Fathers. James Madison and his colleagues at the Federal Convention
devised an elaborate constitutional machine. "By so contriving the
interior structure of the government," they sought to insure "that its
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of
keeping each other in their proper places." As a check against usurpa
tion, they divided the power of amending the Constitution and
allocated the responsibilities of government between the states and the
Union; to curb the dangers of centralizing administration, they arranged
that the president and the senators be chosen in a manner that would
ensure their responsiveness to the diversity of state and local concerns;
to safeguard constitutionalism and the rule of law, they established an
independent, federal judiciary and conferred on it the power of judicial

Cato'sLetttrs, 1:72, 82, 238, 256-59, 2:56, 230-34: Nos. 11,13, 31, 33, 40, 60, 7 and 21
January, 27 May, 17 June, and 5 August 1721, and 6 January 1722.
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review; and to prevent the national government from falling into the
hands of a single faction, they instituted a separation of powers and a
system of checks and balances.
Nowhere did they presume on the virtue of those chosen for high
office. Instead, Madison and his colleagues practiced indirection and
followed "a policy of supplying by opposite and rival interests, the
defect of better motives." As he put it, "The interest of the man must
be connected with the constitutional rights of the place... .The constant
aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that
each may be a check on the other; that the private interest of every
individual, may be a centinel over the public rights." To this end, those
serving in each of the various branches of the government were to be
given "the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to
resist encroachments of the others."^' In the same spirit, Alexander
Hamilton noted that "the dissimilar modes of constituting the several
component parts of the government" would be such that "there would
be little probability of a common interest to cement these different
branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors."^^ When
seen from this angle, the American Constitution presents itself as a
perpetual-motion machine. "To form a moderate government,"
Montesquieu tells us, "it is necessary to combine powers, to regulate
them, to temper them, to make them act, to give, so to speak, a ballast
to one in order to put it in a condition to resist another; this is a
masterpiece of legislation, which chance rarely produces and prudence
is rarely allowed to produce."'^ The Founding Fathers were practitio
ners of modernity's characteristic "politics of distrust."
It would, however, be an error to suppose that the American
Founders were straightforward exponents of an unmitigatedly modern
constitutionalism. In The Spirit of the Lam, Montesquieu singles out
monarchy for close examination. "In monarchies," he observes, "policy
makes great things happen with as little of virtue as it can, just as in the
most beautiful machines, art also employs as little of movement, of
forces, of wheels as is possible. The state subsists independently of love
of the fatherland, of desire for true glory, of self-renunciation, of
" Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke
(Middletown: Wesle)ran University Press, 1961), 349 (No 51).
The Federalist, 405 (No. 60).
Montesquieu, De Tesprit des lois, 1.5.14, in Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu, 2:297.
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sacrifice of one's dearest interests, and of all those heroic virtues which
we find in the ancients and know only from hearing them spoken of."
If virtue and moderation can be discarded, it is because in a monarchy
"the laws take the place of all these virtues, for which there is no need;
the state confers on you a dispensation from them."''*
If monarchy can nonetheless produce good government, it is
because honor "takes the place of the political virtue" to be found in
republics. The honor that Montesquieu has in mind is artificial: if it
gives rise not to civic virtue but to the vices characteristic of courtiers,
it is because it is a "false honor," which demands artificial "preferences
and distinctions" and is grounded in "the prejudice of each person and
condition." The consequences of this all-pervasive "prejudice" are
paradoxical but undeniable. "In well-regulated monarchies, Montes
quieu contends, "everyone will be something like a good citizen while
one will rarely find someone who is a good man. Monarchy he
compares to Newton's "system of the universe, where there is a force
which ceaselessly repels all bodies from the center and a force of
gravity which draws them to it. Honor makes all the parts of the body
politic move; it binds them by its own actions; and it happens that each
pursues the common good while believing that he is pursuing his own
particular interests."" Monarchies are ruled by something like Adam
Smith's "invisible hand."
On the face of it, monarchical government would appear to be
absolute: such was certainly the standard English view of France. But,
according to Montesquieu, just the opposite is the case. In states
monarchical and moderate," he explains, "power is limited by that
which is its spring; I mean to say honor, which reigns, like a monarch,
over the prince and over the people." Honor reigns and limits
monarchical power because "honor has its laws and regulations and
knows not how to bend" and because "it depends on its own caprice
and not on that of another." For this reason, honor is linked with
constitutional government: its rules and laws may be as irrational and
capricious as honor is itself artificial and false, but, reinforced as they
are by human vanity, they do persist; and honor, though it may be
replete with "whimsicalities {bis;arrenes)" can therefore "be found only
" Montesquieu, De I'esprit des his, 1.3.5, in Oamres comphtes dt Montesquieu, 2:255—56.
" Montesquieu, De I'esprit des his, 1.3.6-7,5.24.6, in Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu, 2:256-57,
719.
1
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in states where the constitution is fixed and the laws are certain." This
explains why a monarchy can relax its springs without danger as much
as it wants: it is not fragile; it does not require vigilance; it need not
remain tense; "it maintains itself by its laws"; and like a well-made
machine, it possesses a "momentum" all its own, for the honor that
sets it in motion is in no way painful: it "is favored by the passions and
favors them in its turn."^®
This particular discussion had a profound impact on the framers
of the American Constitution, and they put Montesquieu's observation
to a use that belied his attempts to belittle the character of the honor
involved. In discussing the separation of powers, Madison added that
the elected official's "pride and vanity" would "attach him to a form of
government which favors his pretensions, and gives him a share in its
honors and distinctions." Because he and his colleagues represented
the dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations," they would
be particularly sensible to every prospect of pubUc danger, or of a
dishonorable sta^ation in public affairs." The congressmen, the
senators, the president, and the federal judges would not always be men
of virtue, but the exalted character of their separate and distinct stations
would have on them the effect which Montesquieu had attributed to
the articulation of a monarchy into its various, graded orders and ranks:
it would inspire in them a passion for what the French philosophe
resolutely refused to dignify as more than "false honor," and this
artificially induced longing would tend to summon forth from these
officials something in its effects indistinguishable from pubUc-spiritedness. In most cases, their sense of their own stature would be a spur
adequate to insure the proper performance of their duties, and it would
nearly always be a sufficient deterrent to the sacrifice of their rightful
prerogatives to the ambitions and material interests of their rivals.
Within each branch of government a coUegial spirit would develop:
each branch could be trusted to exercise a jealous oversight with regard
to the others.®^
^ Montesquieu, Dt I'esprit dts his, 1.3.8-10, 4.5, in Oeuvres computes de Montesqmeu, 2:258-61,
266.
"Consider TheFederaBst,386 (No 57) and 395 (Na 58), in light of A Drfence of the Constitutions
of Government of the United States of America (1787-88), in Works of John Adams, 6:219; compare
Montesquieu, De I'esprit des lois, 2.11.9, with 1.3.5-7, in Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu,
2:255-57,409-10; and see Anne M. Cohler, Montesquieu's Comparative Politics and the Spirit of
American Constitutionalism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988), 34—169.
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As is evident upon reflection, the American separation of powers
is two-dimensional: for it seems to deny what it asserts, and it seeks to
vindicate man's capacity for self-government by teaching him to
acknowledge the liniits of that capacity and to conduct his affairs
accordingly. On the one hand, it is egalitarian and distinctively modern:
for it presupposes grave doubts as to man's ability to ascend from a
passion for private advantage to a dedication to justice and the
transcendent good, and it therefore embodies the spirit of jealous
distrust propagated by Locke, Algernon Sidney, the radical Whigs, and
Bolingbroke; it mimics the constitutional machinery variously depicted
by Harrington, Locke, Bolingbroke, Hume, Montesquieu, Blackstone,
and Lolme; and it considerably restricts the scope of American
statesmanship thereby. On the other hand, it is self-consciously
aristocratic and classical in character: for it presupposes a capacity for
logos on the part of some men, and it deliberately opens up for these
few a public space comparable to what the ancient Greeks had called
"the middle ground"; it provides them with a field for the exercise of
virtue; and it harnesses the pride of the country's most ambitious men
in service to the public good. It even seeks by an indirect process,
similar in its purpose to the civic paidela of the classical republics, to
transform that pride and that ambition into something considerably
more exalted; and to the extent that it succeeds in eliciting a simulac
rum of virtue from the nation's highest officials, it educates the general
public in the most effectual way: by the shining examples it holds up
for emulation.'®
The new American republic was not what the ancients would have
called a democracy. Nor can it be accurately described as an aristocracy,
an oligarchy, or even a limited monarchy. It certainly was not a republic
of virtue. And yet its framers doubted whether it could survive if its
citizens were utterly bereft of that quality. The American republic was,
as James Madison would later insist, "a system without a precedent

^ Compare Martin Diamond, "The Separation of Powers and the Mixed Regime," PuhBus 8,
na 3 (1978): 33-43, with Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., "Separation of Powers in the American
Constitution," in MansfieId,^4!!irnca'xCo»r/r/wlf»»a/i'««/(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1991), 115-27, and see William Kristol, "The Problem of the Separation of Powers:
Federalist 47-51," in Charles R. Kesler, ed.. Saving the devolution: The Federalist Papers and the
American Founding (New York: Free Press,1987), 100-30.
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ancient or modern."®' It claimed to be unmixed. In a sense, it was.®°
And yet, in its own, strange, convoluted way, it bore a certain, undeni
able resemblance to what the ancients chose to refer to as a mixed
regime.*^' It occupied an intermediate status between the enlightened
despotism of Thomas Hobbes and the classical republicanism of the
ancient Greeks; and in assessing the degree to which man could jusdy
be termed a political animal, its advocates tried to strike an appropriate
balance.
James Madison and his colleagues paid careful attention to the
wealmess of human reason and to its propensity to fall under passion's
sway.®^ But, just as they rejected enlightened despotism and a slavish
dependence on political architecture and on man's unreasoning spirit
of resistance, so they stopped well short of endorsing the presumption,
fundamental to the proponents of these mechanical principles, that
reason is simply the slave of the passions.®® They considered govern
ment "a reflection on human nature," and they were acutely sensitive
to the fact that men are not angelic.®^ They thought that the defects in
human nature that render government necessary render it rightly
suspect as well. Here, again, Madison's observation is apt: "In framing
a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great

''James Madison, "Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787," in Max Farrand, ed., The
TjtcordsoJtheTederalConvention of1787 (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1911-37), 3:539-51
(at 539).
^ See Diamond, "The Separation of Powers and the Mixed Regime," 33-43, and John
Agresto, '"A System Without a Precedent"—James Madison and theRevolution in Republican
Liberty," South AtlanticQuarterly 82 (1983): 129-44.
" After noting Rahe, Republics and Modem, 183-85, compare Paul Eidelberg, The Philosophy of
the American Constitution: APjunterpretation ofthe Intentionsofthe FoundingFathers (NewYork: Free
Press, 1968), 40-260, with Harvey C Mansfield,Jr., "Liberal Democracyas a Mixed Regime,"
in Mansfield, The Spirit ofUberahm (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 1-15, and
see Kristol, "The Problem of the Separation of Powers," 100-30.
"See TheFederaUst, 4-5 (Na 1), 16-17 (No. 3), 25-27 (No. 5), 29-32 (Na 6), 56-65 (Na 10),
81 (No. 13), 94-98 (No. 15), 99-105 (No 16), 105 (No 17), 128 (No 20), 144 (No 22), 155
(No. 24), 173-74 (No. 27), 194-95 (no 31), 212 (No 34), 231-32 (No ST), 268-69,275 (No
41), 283 (No. 42), 333-34 (No 48), 338-43 (No 49), 346 (No 50), 374,378 (No 55), 395-96
(tjo 58), 428-25 (No 63), 475 (No 70), 481-83 (No 71), 491-92 (No 72), 495-96 (No 73),
510-11 (No 76), 589-90 (No 85).
" Compare Daniel Walker Howe, "The Language of Faculty Psychology in The FederaUst
Pt^ersf in Terence Bali and J. G. A. Pocock, eds.. Conceptual Change and the Constitution
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988), 107-36, with the evidence presented in Rahe,
Republics Ancient and Modem, 260-90,293-315,371-92,409-24,429-40,454—79,493-513.
" TheFederaUst, 349 Q*4o 51).
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difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul
the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself."
Madison and his colleagues sought to solve this quandary by restoring,
within a carefuUy defined and limited sphere, the autonomy of moral
and political reason. By means of the extended sphere, federalism, the
separation of powers, and the other "inventions of prudence" built into
the constitutional frame, they hoped that "the passions" of the citizens
could "be controuled and regulated by the government" so that "the
reason of the public," liberated from bondage, might serve "to controul
and regulate the government" in turn.^ In this regard, their description
of the American regime bears a certain resemblance to Polybius's
depiction of Rome, for the American Constitution deploys institutional
checks not only as a substitute but also as a reinforcement and
inspiration for a virtue of sorts.®®
In their judgment of the human capacity for transcendence, the
authors of The Federalist staked out a position intermediate between
Hobbes and the ancient republicans somewhat closer to "the politics
of distrust" than to "the politics of trust." Thus, for example, James
Madison readily acknowledged that "there is a degree of depravity in
mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and
distrust." But he insisted as well that "there are other qualities in human
nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence," and
he contended that "republican government presupposes the existence
of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form." "Were the
pictures," he observed, "which have been drawn by the political
jealousy of some among us, faithful likenesses of the human character,
the inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men
for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism
can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another." In
much the same spirit, Alexander Hamilton remarked in one passage
that "the history of human conduct does not warrant" an "exalted
opinion of human virtue" and then added, almost immediately
thereafter, that "the supposition of universal venality in human nature
is litde less an error in political reasoning than the supposition of
universal rectitude. The institution of delegated power implies that
" Compare The Federalist, 349 (Na 51) with 343 (No. 49).
" Consider Polybius, 6.3-18, in light of Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Taming the Prince: The
j4mbivalence of Modem Executive Power (New York: Free Press, 1989), 75—85.
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there is a portion of virtue and honor atnong mankind, which may be
a reasonable foundation of confidence." The New Yorker would
certainly not have queried the claim advanced by the Virginian that "the
aim of every political Constitution is or ought to be first to obtain for
rulers, men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to
pursue the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take
the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they
continue to hold their public trust.
The establishment of the American republic was a bold experi
ment in the reconciliation of wisdom and virtue with popular consent.
That regime was to be, first and foremost, a constitutional polity. It
made no provision for the direct rule of reason, for its founders knew
better than to suppose the United States "a nation of philosophers."
Instead, it embodied the next best expedient: the rule of law. And so it
was guided less by popular whimsy than by "reverence" and "venera
tion for a document which presented itself to the people as an
instrument for the implementation of their Declaration of Independ
ence and thereby as a surrogate for the higher law of reason proclaimed
t erein. As John Quincy Adams put it in a work published some fifty
years after the Constitution's ratification, "Its VIRTUES, its republican
character, consisted in its conformity to the principles proclaimed in
the Declaration of Independence, and as its administration must
necessarily be always pliable to the fluctuating varieties of public
opinion; its stability and duration by a like overruling and irresistible
necessity, was to depend upon the stability and duration in the hearts
and minds of the people of that virtue, or in other words, of those
principles proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, and
embodied in the Constitution of the United States."^®
To describe the character of that constitution, Abraham Lincoln
would later borrow a famous biblical metaphor. The Declaration of
Independence is worthy of reverence, he argued, above all else because
it embodies "the principle of 'Liberty to all'—the principle that clears
the path for all—gives hope to all—and, by consequence, enterprie^, and

" Compare Madison, The FederaBst, 378 (Na 56) and 384 (No. 57), with Hamilton, Tht
FederaBst, 505-6 (No. 75) and 513-14 (No. 76).
" Consider John Quincy Adams, TheJubilee ofthe Constitution (New York: S. Coleman, 1839),
54, in light of Madison, The FederaBst, 338-43 (No. 49); then see Aristode, The PoBtics,
1284a3-b33,1286a7-1288a5, and note Hamilton, The FederaBst, 163 (No. 25).
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industry to all—The assertion of that principle, at that time,was the word,
^fitly spoketf which has proved an 'apple of gold' to us. The Union, and
the Constitution, are the picture of silver, subsequently framed around it.
The picture was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn,
made forth.^ apple—«o/the apple for the
and preserve it. The picture
picture." To be precise, for the purpose of putting flesh on that "word,
'fitl^ spokenl" the American republic conferred on a constitution,
ultimately derivative from the people but placed for the most part
beyond their reach, a sacred authority limiting their prerogatives,
directing their common activities, and forming their character as
citizens.^^ In this fashion, it reminded them that man's capacity for selfgovernment can be vindicated only if it can be shown to serve a higher
purpose. "Justice is the end of government," James Madison observed
in concluding his defense of the separation of powers. It is the end of
civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be
obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit."™
To trmlfp sense of American constitutionalism and its central
doctrine the separation of powers, one must initially pay carefol
attention to the critique of classical republicanism developed by t e
founders of modern political science, and one must thoroughly
assimilate the first principles of John Locke and the political architec
ture ofJames Harrington and his many heirs. But then one must pause,
turn back, and rethink the political science of ancient times. One must
ponder anew Aristotle's claim that nothing other than the provision of
a common education ipaidetd) can turn a multitude (plethos) into a unit
and constitute it as apolis, and one must reconsider his contention that
the distribution and disposition of a given community's offices and
honors {taxis ton archoti) is the most important determinant of thepaideia
" Compare Abraham Lincoln,"Fragment on the Constitution and Union,"January 1861, in
Roy P. Basler, ed.. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln(New Brunswick: Rubers University
Press, 1953-55), 4:168-69, with Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines
(Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1963), 1:11-12 (Introduction), and see Proverbs,25:11;
then, note The Federalist, 338-43 (No. 49), and see Lincoln,"Address before the Young Men's
Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois," 27 January 1838, in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln,
1:108-15.
™ The Federalist, 352 (Na 51).
" See Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., "Social Science and the Constitution," in Allan Bloom, ed..
Confronting the Constitution: The Challenge to Locke, Montesquieu, J^erson, and the Federalists from
Utilitarianism, Flistoricism, Marxism, Freudianism, Pragptatism, andFodstentiaUsm (Washington, DC:
American Enterprise Institute, 1990), 411-36.
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that gives it its character as a regime {politeid). One must think through
the implications of Augustine's assertion that "a people is a multim^nous assemblage of rational beings united by concord regarding loved
things held in common"; one must weigh in the balance Isocrates'
claim that thepoliteia is the political community's "soul"; and one must
remind oneself of the authority which the Greeks and Romans
conferred on what they respectively called the patrioi nomoi and the mos
maiorum. For, to the extent that the federal charter was the Declaration's
"word" made flesh, it was to provide that paideia, to embody "that
concord," to make manifest that "soul," to serve as the nation's
ancestral constitution {patriospoliteid), and to exemplify its mos maiorum.
For Americans, the Constitution was to become what Madison and his
fellow framers intended it to be: the "depository possessed of perma
nence" described by Montesquieu, an object of "allegiance or loyalty"
fulfilling what John Stuart Mill took to be one of the conditions of
"permanent political society." It was that "something which is settled,
something permanent, and not to be called in question; something
which, by general agreement, has a right to be where it is, and to be
secure against disturbance, whatever else may change." As such, it has
enabled Americans "to weather" many "storms, and pass through
turbulent times" unscathed—confident, except during their civil war,
that, "however important the interests about which men fell out, the
conflict did not affect the fundamental principle of the system of social
union which happened to exist; nor threaten large portions of the
community with the subversion of that on which they had built their
calculations and with which their hopes and aims had become identi
fied.'"'

^ Compare Aristotle, The Po&iics, 1263b36-37 with 1276a8-bl5, and see 1278b6-15; then,
consider Augustine, De civitate Dei, 19.24; Isocrates, 7.14; and Mill, "Coleridge," in Colkcted
Works of]ohn Stuart Mill,10:117-63 (at 133-34), in light of Rahe, Republics Ancient andModern,
17-27,106-33, and 144—52; and see The Federalist, 338-43 (Na 49). For an attempt to read
the Constitution in this light, see George Anastaplo, The Constitution of 1787: A Commentaiy
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989) and The Amendments to the Constitution: A
Commentaiy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

